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Abstract
This paper examines the political economy of coordination in a simple two-sector model in
which individuals' choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization. We demonstrate
the existence of multiple equilibria; the economy is either characterized by the use of a
traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized
technology and a high level of industrialization. Relative to the traditional technology, the
mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off.  We show
that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility
of Pareto-improving coordination by an elected policy-maker, even when we allow for income
redistribution.
Keywords: Industrialization, Choice of Technology, Government Policy.
JEL Codes: O14, H101 Introduction
An increase in industrial activity, accompanied by a decline in agriculture's share
in total output, has been a central element of the development experience of al-
most every high-income country.1 In many of these countries changes in agricultural
technology either preceded or accompanied industrialization (Chenery, Robinson and
Syrquin 1986). Historic examples include the widespread mechanization of agricul-
tural production in England prior to the Industrial Revolution (Nurkse 1953), in the
US between 1860s and World War I (Oshima 1984; Kawagoe, Otsuka and Hayami
1984), and in Japan at the turn of the century (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973).2 More
recent examples include the East Asian economies in the post World War II period.
Between 1960 and 1990, relative to other Asian and African countries, these countries
experienced a sharp rise in the agricultural capital-labor ratio and a decline in the
use of labor in agriculture (see Figures 1 and 2).
This paper identi¯es how a coordination failure among investors in the agricul-
tural sector can limit industrialization, and examines the constraints facing politicians
seeking to rectify this failure. We construct a simple two sector model populated by
landowners and workers. Relative to the traditional technology, the mechanized agri-
cultural technology increases industrialization and returns to landowners but reduces
workers' incomes. We show that multiple equilibria in the choice of technology can
cause the use of the traditional agricultural technology and low levels of industrializa-
tion to persist. Further, the distributional implications of the mechanized technology
may inhibit coordination by an elected policy-maker.
Speci¯cally, we assume the policy-maker is elected from among the citizens and
1Kuznet (1959) remains among the best known expositions of this phenomenon.
2A common example of such mechanization was the widespread replacement of horse drawn
equipment by equipment powered by internal combustion.
2examine alternative policy regimes. In the ¯rst, the policy-maker directly chooses
the agricultural technology, while in the second, she provides price subsidies but
investment decisions remain decentralized. In either case she can redistribute income
via an anonymous tax and transfer policy. In the absence of policy-commitment, the
policy-maker's returns from the choice of technology and redistribution policy depend
on her group identity. Hence, the policy-maker's group identity a®ects the possibility
of coordination. If the policy-maker can directly invest in the agricultural technology
then she chooses the mechanized technology and the population group to which she
does not belong is made worse o®. If investment decisions remain decentralized then
the outcome varies with the policy-maker's group identity. If the policy-maker is a
landowner, then the mechanized technology is chosen and workers are worse o®. If the
policy-maker is a worker, then landowners, anticipating high levels of redistribution,
stick with the traditional technology. This last case constitutes a political failure
since with the same set of policy instruments a Pareto superior equilibrium could be
realized if the policy-maker could commit to a redistribution policy.3
In this model, a key feature of the mechanized technology is it's use of industrial
inputs. The fact that newer, more e±cient, agricultural technologies are also more
likely to use industrial inputs is well documented, a well-known example being the
adoption of high yielding crop varieties (Evenson and Westphal (1995)). However,
the implications of such inter-sector linkages for industrialization remain controver-
sial. Some, like Lewis (1955), and Hirschman (1958), argue that the mechanization
of agricultural production helps transfer resources, especially labor, to the industrial
sector. Others argue that changes in agricultural methods of production a®ect in-
dustrialization by increasing the (agricultural) demand for industrial goods (see, for
3Dixit and Londegran (1995) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) examine how the distributional
consequences of investments can prevent their adoption. They di®er from our paper in their focus
on economic environments characterized by an unique equilibrium.
3instance, Johnston and Mellor (1961) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989a)). In
our model we allow for both supply-side and demand-side linkages between the two
sectors.4
The use of the mechanized technology shifts labor from a constant returns to scale
sector (agriculture) to an increasing returns to scale sector (industry). This increases
the number of industrial varieties produced and reduces the price per variety. This,
in turn, reduces the price of adopting the mechanized technology and lowers con-
sumer prices. Both forces work to make the combination of mechanized agriculture
and industrialization self-sustaining. However, as prices are invariant to any single
citizen's investment decision the choice of the traditional agricultural technology and
low levels of industrialization also remains an equilibrium. This multiplicity of equi-
libria derives from the pecuniary externalities associated with use of the mechanized
technology. The classic study documenting that technology adoption in agriculture is
closely linked to pro¯tability and market size remains the study by Griliches (1957)
on the spread of hybrid seed corn in U.S. agriculture (see Besley and Case (1993) for
a review of this literature).
The idea that a coordination failure among investors in the agricultural sector
can cause agricultural stagnation and industrial backwardness to persist is echoed
in the literature on `big push' models of industrialization (see, for example, Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989b)).5 In these papers a coordination failure among investors
can prevent the economy from obtaining the Pareto superior high industrialization
equilibrium. Hence, the conclusion that governments should coordinate investment
activity.6 Our innovation is to demonstrate that this conclusion is sensitive to the
4The relative importance of supply-side and demand-side linkages between agriculture and in-
dustry was also the basis of the famous Corn law debate between Malthus and Ricardo.
5The idea that a coordination failure amongst investors may cause low levels of industrialization
to persist was ¯rst discussed by Rosenstein Rodan (1943).
6The East Asian growth miracle is often, in part, attributed to the government's coordination
4assumption that citizens have identical factor endowments. In our model, adoption of
the mechanized technology bene¯ts landowners but leaves workers worse o®. These
distributional implications of technological change a®ect both the possibility and the
welfare implications of policy-led coordination.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a two sector model in
which landowners face a choice of agricultural technology to examine how landowners'
investment decisions a®ect industrialization. Section 3 examines the political economy
of coordination, and Section 4 concludes with a discussion of possible extensions.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Agricultural Technology Adoption and Industri-
alization
In this section we show how, in the presence of inter-sector production linkages,
landowners' agricultural technology choice a®ects the extent of industrialization, as
measured by the number of industrial varieties produced.
2.1 Economic Environment
The economy consists of N citizens, indexed by j 2 N = f1;:::;Ng, and lasts a single
period. Total labor and land endowments are L > 1 units of labor and one unit of
land. Citizen j0s labor endowment is denoted as ®jL, and her land endowment as ¯j
policy, e.g. Wade (1990).
7Sah and Stiglitz (1984, 1987) examine how policy led changes in the agriculture-industry terms
of trade a®ect industrialization, and note that industrial policies may make some citizens' worse o®.
They, however, do not examine how these adverse distributional consequences a®ect the feasibility
of industrialization.
5where ®j;¯j 2 [0;1]. All landowners have identical land endowments, and there is no
market for land. Labor is fully mobile across sectors.
A citizen supplies her labor and land endowment for production, and earns income
yj ´ ®jwL+¯j¼, where ¼ is the return on land and w is the wage. She uses her income
to buy food and manufactures, denoted as F and M respectively. Her preferences
take the form: uj = F ºM1¡º, where º 2 ]0;1[, and º 6= 1
2.
Landowners produce food using either a basic or mechanized technology, indexed
by ¿ 2 fb;mg. These technologies are de¯ned as:
Fb = min(l;h)
Fm = min
Ã
l
°
;h;
M
·
!
l denotes the labor requirement and h the land requirement. The parameters ° 2 ]0;1[
and · 2 ]0;1] characterize the e±ciency of the production function. I assume that
M > · and that land supply limits food production. Hence, independent of the
agricultural technology in use one unit of food is produced.8 Use of the mechanized
technology is, however, associated with an additional demand for · units of manu-
factures and a reduced labor demand of ° < 1 units. We normalize the price of food
and denote the price of manufactures by P. Returns to land vary with agricultural
technology: ¼b = 1¡wb and ¼m = 1¡°wm¡·P. We assume the labor endowment is
su±ciently large so that L > 1
2º¡1. This implies that ¼b > wbL > 0.9 We also assume
that no single individual's actions can in°uence factor prices.
Manufactures are produced in the industrial sector which is characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition. A continuum of ¯rms, indexed by i, produce di®erent varieties
of manufactures. Firm i produces quantity xi of variety i and prices it at pi: These
8º > 0 rules out the corner solution of zero food production.
9The condition ¼b > wbL simpli¯es to L > 1
2º¡1. The condition wbL > 0 simpli¯es to
(1¡º)
º(L¡1)L > 0
which is positive for L > 1.
6varieties are aggregated into a single manufactures good via a production function
which exhibits constant elasticity of substitution in the quantities of each product
type (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982)). That is,
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n is the set of varieties produced in equilibrium and " is the elasticity of substitution
across varieties. I assume " > 1 such that product varieties are imperfect substitutes.
½ ´ "¡1
" measures citizens' intensity of preference for variety. Given a su±ciently large
number of industrial varieties, the elasticity of inverse demand faced by a producer can
be approximated as 1 ¡ ½ (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Costless product di®erentiation
by ¯rms implies that each ¯rm produces a di®erent variety.
The production functions for all industrial varieties are identical.10 Production
of variety i involves a ¯xed cost of ± labor units and a marginal cost of Á units of
output. Firm i 's production function is:
xi =
li¡±
Á for li > ±; 0 otherwise
with associated pro¯ts: pixi ¡ w(Áxi + ±):
Monopolistic competition implies that, in equilibrium, variety i0s price equates marginal
revenue (½pi) and marginal cost. Hence pi("¡1
" ) = Áw: For notational simplicity as-
sume Á = "¡1
" : Thus variety i0s price equals the wage, or
pi = w (1)
10The industry wide demand for labor is ld =
npx
w :
7Monopolistic competition also implies that, in equilibrium, pixi = w(Áxi +±): Hence,
output per ¯rm is constant at
xi =
±
1 ¡ Á
(2)
Firms produce the same output per variety, x, and price each variety identically at
price p.11 The manufactures production function simpli¯es to M = n
"
"¡1x (with
P = n
1
1¡"p).
To solve for equilibrium we ¯rst characterize the production and consumption
decisions associated with each agricultural technology and then identify landowners'
technology choice. As landowners are identical we restrict attention to the case where
all landowners choose the same technology.
2.2 Choice of Technology
Agricultural labor demand, and therefore the wage, varies with the choice of technol-
ogy. Equating labor demand and supply under each technology gives us
wb =
xnbpb
L ¡ 1
and wm =
xnmpm
L ¡ °
(3)
Combining equation (3) with the price wage identity (equation (1)) gives us our ¯rst
result.
Proposition 1: Use of the mechanized agricultural technology increases industrial-
ization.
Use of the mechanized agricultural technology reduces agricultural labor demand
by (1 ¡ °) units. The main issue is whether the increase in industrial labor supply
only alters factor prices or also increases the number of industrial varieties produced.
Proposition 1 tells us that the latter holds. This reason is that since industrial varieties
11The symmetric way in which industrial varieties enter the formulation of M and convexity
(0 < ½ < 1) implies that citizens consume identical amounts of each variety.
8are imperfect substitutes (½ < 1), consumers exhibit a love for variety. Hence, the
production of industrial varieties exhibit positive returns to the division of labor. As a
result labor availability, not demand, limits industrialization. By shifting labor away
from a constant returns to scale sector (agriculture) to an increasing returns to scale
sector (industry) the mechanized agricultural technology increases output .
The ¯nal demand for variety x in the economy is
x =
Ã
P¿
p¿
!" E¿
P¿
(4)
E¿ is the total expenditure on manufactures, consisting of consumer and agricultural
sector expenditure. Consumer expenditure is given by
N P
j=1
(1¡º)yj.12 Use of the mech-
anized agricultural technology generates an additional agricultural sector demand of
·Pa units. Hence,
Eb = (1 ¡ º)((L ¡ 1)wb + 1) (5)
Em = (1 ¡ º)((L ¡ °)wm + 1) + ·ºPm
Combining equations (4) and (5) gives the price of industrial varieties associated with
the use of each technology.
pb =
1 ¡ º
ºnbx
and pm =
1 ¡ º
ºnm(x ¡ n
"
1¡"
m ·)
(6)
Due to imperfect substitutability between industrial varieties the e±ciency of man-
ufactures production is increasing in the number of varieties produced.13 Therefore,
for a ¯xed E¿, P falls as n rises. This a®ects p in three ways. For any single ¯rm
i a fall in P reduces the pro¯ts associated with producing variety i. This negative
12Identical homothetic preferences imply that total consumer demand is the aggregation of indi-
vidual demand functions.
13Imperfect substitutability between varieties implies that the lower is n the more intensively
consumers substitute for missing inputs in their consumption of the manufactures aggregate.
9product market e®ect lowers p. On the other hand, the fall in P creates two positive
pecuniary externalities. First, it reduces the cost of using the mechanized agricul-
tural technology and makes its adoption more likely. Conditional on its adoption,
manufactures demand increases. This cost (or forward) linkage between ¯rms and
the agricultural sector enhances ¯rm pro¯ts and raises p. For similar reasons, a fall
in P also generates a demand (or backward) linkage by raising consumer expenditure
on manufactures.
The strength of the inter-sector linkages, and the extent of labor saving associated
with the mechanized agricultural technology, determine the relative strengths of the
negative product market e®ect and positive pecuniary externalities. These, in turn,
determine the price of industrial varieties, p, and landowners' technology choice.
Proposition 2: Landowners' technology choice varies with the strength of inter-
sector linkages, ·, and the extent of labor saving, °, associated with the mechanized
agricultural technology
(i) Landowners choose the mechanized technology if ·
(1¡°) < n
1
"¡1
b and the basic tech-
nology if ·
(1¡°) > n
1
"¡1
m
(ii) Multiple investment equilibria exist such that landowners either choose the basic
or the mechanized technology whenever
n
1
("¡1)
m ¸
·
(1 ¡ °)
¸ n
1
("¡1)
b
For low values of · and ° the mechanized agricultural technology minimizes landown-
ers factor costs. This leads to an unique investment equilibrium in which all landown-
ers choose the mechanized agricultural technology. However, as
@pm
@· > 0, the mech-
anized technology becomes more expensive as · rises. For a su±ciently high · the
positive pecuniary externalities associated with use of the mechanized technology
cannot compensate for the higher factor prices. An unique investment equilibrium in
which landowners choose the basic agricultural technology results.
10For intermediate values of · and ° increasing returns in the manufacturing sector,
combined with the possibility of pecuniary externalities, creates multiple investment
equilibria. If landowners choose the basic technology few industrial varieties are
produced at a relatively high cost. Given this price structure, a landowner's best
response is to choose the basic technology. The result is an equilibrium in which
landowners choose the basic technology. If, instead, landowners choose the mecha-
nized technology more industrial varieties are produced and the cost of adopting the
mechanized technology is reduced. In addition, consumer demand for manufactures
rises. This makes the combination of landowners choosing the mechanized technology
and a higher level of industrialization sustainable.
Food production is the same under the two technologies, but industrial output is
higher with the mechanized technology in use. Social surplus (SS) is given by the
sum of citizens' indirect utilities, such that
SSb =
1
º
"
ºnb
"
"¡1x
1 ¡ º
#1¡º
and ;SSm =
1
º
"
º(nm
"
"¡1x ¡ ·)
1 ¡ º
#1¡º
(7)
Lemma 1: The mechanized agricultural technology maximizes social surplus in the
multiple equilibria regime.
Consumers' love of variety implies that social surplus is increasing in the number of
industrial varieties produced. On the other hand, social surplus is decreasing in the
strength of inter-sector linkages (as captured by ·) since
@pm
@· > 0. The mechanized
technology maximizes social surplus only if the e±ciency gains (in terms of the number
of industrial varieties produced) outweighs the potential price increase associated with
its use. Lemma 1 tells us that this is true in the multiple equilibria regime.
113 The Political Process and Coordination
The role for the government as a coordinator of economic activity has been widely
discussed in the literature on coordination failures in industrial investment.14 Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989b), for instance, write in the context of big push models of
industrialization, `The analysis may have implications for the role of government
in the development process. First, a program that encourages industrialization in
many sectors simultaneously can substantially boost income and welfare even when
investment in any one sector appears unpro¯table.'
Most existing multiple equilibria models of industrialization are representative
agent models. In these, it is immediate that all individuals are better o® in the output-
maximizing high industrialization equilibrium. The possibility of welfare-improving
coordination in these models, therefore, turns on whether policies which make the
high investment equilibrium the unique outcome for the economy exist (on this, see
Bond and Pande (2005)). However, with heterogeneity in factor endowments some
individuals may be worse o® in the high investment equilibrium. In such a setting
examining how the political economy of coordination can a®ect a governments' ability
to implement a Pareto superior outcome for the economy becomes relevant.
We focus on the case where multiple investment equilibria exist, that is n
1
(1¡")
m ¸
·
(1¡°) ¸ n
1
(1¡")
b , and every citizen is either a landowner or a wage laborer. To focus on
the aggregate investment e®ects of government led coordination we consider a large
14An early argument in favor of government coordination was o®ered by Scitovsky (1954),` Market
prices, however, re°ect the economic situation as it is and not as it will be. For this reason they
are more useful for coordinating current production decisions .. than .. for coordinating investment
decisions which have delayed e®ects .. hence the belief that there is need either for centralized
investment planning or some additional communication system to supplement the pricing system as
a signalling device.'
12population (N ! 1); and ¯xed landowner and worker population shares.15 Every
landowner ` (2 K = f1;::kg) owns 1
k units of land and earns an income y` = ¼¿
k ; while
every worker ! (2 W = fk + 1;:::Ng) supplies L
N¡k labor units and earns an income
y! = w¿L
N¡k: Finally, we assume that k satis¯es the inequality
¼b
k >
wbL
N¡k.
We consider a citizen candidate model of politics in which citizens choose whether
to stand for election (Osborne and Slivinski (1996); Besley and Coate (1997)). The
time line of events is { Citizens decide whether to enter as candidates. Then, citizens
elect a policy-maker from the pool of citizen candidates. The policy-maker announces
the parameters of the coordination policy. Finally, landowners invest in an agricul-
tural technology, and payo®s are realized. A key assumption is that candidates cannot
commit to policies prior to election. This implies that the policy-maker will always
select the policy which maximizes her private return. Anticipating this, citizens will
condition their vote on candidates' policy preferences.16 The inability of politicians
to commit to policies has been documented in a wide variety of contexts { see, for
instance, Butler, Lee and Moretti (2004) and Pande (2003).
We restrict attention to one candidate equilibria in which a member of the majority
group stands for election and wins. Such an equilibrium exists as long as one group of
citizens constitute a strict population majority and the cost of standing for election is
not too high (for details, see Besley and Coate (1997)). We assume these conditions
are satis¯ed.
The absence of policy commitment implies that the elected policy-maker will seek
15Hence, factor prices are invariant to a single investor's actions and changes in her pre-tax income
(holding other citizens income constant) does not a®ect her income transfer. ®j = 0 and ¯j = 1
k for
landowners; and ®j = 1
N¡kand ¯j = 0: for workers
16We, therefore, restrict attention to time-consistent policies, that is policies which the policy-
maker will not have an incentive to change after the technology choice is realized.
13to implement the agricultural technology ¿¤ which maximizes her utility, such that:
¿
¤ = argmax
µ
X
µ w¿L
N ¡ k
¶
+ (1 ¡ X)
µ¼¿
k
¶¶
P
¡(1¡º)
¿ (8)
where X equals 0 if the policy-maker is a landowner and 1 otherwise.17
A policy intervention is feasible only if it is budget balancing in equilibrium. We
do not require budget balancing o® the equilibrium path. This assumption is similar
to the restrictions assumed in the Ramsey capital accumulation model. We also
assume that policy interventions are strongly anonymous, i.e. a citizen's ¯nal payo®
only depends on her strategy.
We examine coordination under two di®erent policy regimes. First, the case where
the policy-maker directly chooses the agricultural technology. Historic examples in-
clude the Soviet collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s, and the setting up of
Chinese state farms in the 1960s. Second, we consider the case where the government
announces price subsidies but investment decisions are chosen by landowners. We
require that the choice of price subsidies satis¯es the budget constraint in equilib-
rium.18 Throughout we assume the policy-maker can redistribute ¯nal incomes via
an anonymous tax and transfer schedule, denoted as (t;T) with the associated bud-
get constraint t
P
j yj = NT: We also assume that, absent coordination, landowners
choose the basic technology. Hence, our welfare comparisons contrast the outcomes
associated with state-led coordination with an equilibrium in which all landowners'
choose the basic technology.
17The policy-maker's group identity depends on whether workers or landowners constitute a strict
majority.
18A di®erent way of distinguishing between these policies is that the ¯rst, where the policy-maker
chooses the technology, ignores the budget constraint while in the second the policy must be budget
balancing in equilibrium.
143.1 Socialization of Investment
We de¯ne investment in the economy as socialized whenever the elected policy-maker
directly invests in the agricultural technology. The sequence of events is { a single
candidate from the majority group stands for election and is elected. She then invests
in the agricultural technology and announces the redistribution policy.19
Proposition 3: With socialized investment the mechanized technology is chosen. If
a landowner is policy-maker then no redistribution occurs and workers are worse o®.
If a worker is policy-maker then full redistribution occurs and landowners are worse
o®.
The mechanized technology maximizes social surplus (Lemma 1). However, the
use of the mechanized technology reduces the relative price of manufactures and raises
landowners' pro¯t. Hence, the mechanized technology maximizes landowners' indirect
utility. In contrast, the price wage equality (equation 1) implies workers are made
worse o®.
A landowner's income exceeds that of a worker. Therefore, if elected policy-maker,
she will invest in the mechanized technology and choose zero redistribution.20 Propo-
sition 3 tells us that this leaves workers' worse o® than when the basic technology was
in use. A worker, if elected policy-maker, implements the mechanized technology and
full redistribution. Proposition 3 also tells us that, whenever landowners' are a pop-
ulation minority, a landowner's agricultural pro¯ts from the basic technology exceed
19The political equilibrium can be justi¯ed as follows: by assumption, the policy-maker cannot
commit to an agricultural technology during the election campaign. Therefore, citizens' anticipate
candidates' policy preferences and vote for the candidate who shares their preferences. For su±-
ciently low entry costs this implies an equilibrium in which a candidate from the majority group
stands for election and win. Anticipating this outcome no other candidate will stand for election.
20By assumption ¼b
k > wbL
N¡k. From proposition 3 we know that ¼m
k > ¼b
k and wmL
N¡k < wbL
N¡k. Hence
¼m
k > wmL
N¡k:
15the per capita income associated with the use of the mechanized technology. Hence
landowners' are worse o® whenever the policy-maker is a worker. Which of these two
outcomes occurs depends on which group constitutes the population majority.
3.2 Decentralized Investment and Coordination
We now consider the case where investment decisions remain decentralized, i.e. are
privately chosen by landowners. The policy-maker seeks to a®ect technology choice by
the use of price subsidies, potentially combined with income redistribution. Examples
of such a policy include the provision of subsidized inputs by agricultural extension
services in many developing countries (Evenson and Westphal 1995).
We start by noting that the multiplicity of equilibria is invariant to income redis-
tribution.
Lemma 2:The multiplicity of equilibria is robust to the use of a budget balancing
linear tax and transfer scheme.
The proof is as follows { with a linear tax and transfer scheme a citizen's ¯nal income
remains a function of her pre-tax income and total income. That is, yc
j = (1 ¡ t)yj +
1
N
Ã
t
P
j2N
yj
!
: Start with an equilibrium in which all landowners choose the basic
technology. If a single landowner deviates to the mechanized technology then both
her pre-tax income (yj) and total income are reduced (see the proof of proposition
2). Since an investor's post tax income is a linear combination of these two it also
falls. Hence, investing in the mechanized technology cannot constitute a pro¯table
deviation for any single investor.21
Multiple investment equilibria arise when an investor's optimal strategy depends
on other investors' strategy (Cooper and John 1988). To a®ect coordination a policy
21This reasoning is similar to the argument provided by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b) for
why pro¯t spill-overs are insu±cient to engender multiple equilibria.
16must make investing in the mechanized technology a dominant strategy for an investor
(for a more general discussion of the issues, see Bond and Pande (2005)). Lemma 2
states that a linear income-based intervention fails to do so.
We now consider the joint use of price subsidies and a linear tax and transfer
scheme by the policy-maker. We assume that price subsidies are not conditioned on
any single investor's investment choice.
Proposition 4 A landowner, if elected policy-maker, announces zero redistribution
and price subsidies such that ¯nal prices are pm;Pm. Landowners respond by choosing
the mechanized technology and workers are made worse o®. If a worker is, instead,
elected policy-maker then, independent of her choice of price subsidies, multiple in-
vestment equilibria persist.
A landowner, if elected policy-maker, announces the prices associated with use
of the mechanized technology, and zero redistribution. It follows from proposition
2 that a landowner's best response is to invest in the mechanized technology. This
policy is budget balancing in equilibrium and maximizes landowners' income. This
choice of redistribution, however, leaves workers worse o® (see proof of proposition 3
for details).
In contrast, if a worker is elected policy-maker then, conditional on landowners
choosing the mechanized technology, she will always implement full redistribution
such that each individual earns (the same) fraction of total output. This renders
a landowner's ¯nal income independent of her actions and implies that investing
in either the basic or the mechanized technology constitutes a (weakly) dominant
strategy for a landowner. Hence, the existence of multiple investment equilibria is
robust to any price subsidies proposed by the policy-maker. This outcome re°ects
how the absence of policy commitment can lead to a political failure { with the same
set of policy instruments, a policy-maker who could commit to less than complete
redistribution, could have delivered a Pareto superior outcome for the economy.
174 Discussion
In this paper we identify how a coordination failure among investors in the agricultural
sector can limit industrialization in this sector, and in linked sectors. We also ¯nd that
the mechanization of agriculture creates both winners and losers. The distributional
consequences of technological change a®ect the policies chosen by an elected policy-
maker. In the absence of policy commitment, government led coordination is likely
to be ine®ective or leave some citizens worse o®.
We assume all workers are equally suited to working in either the agricultural or
industrial sectors. Papers such as Caselli (1999) suggest that, in reality, labor may
be heterogenous with skilled and unskilled labor bene¯tting di®erentially from the
introduction of new technologies. A natural way of allowing for labor heterogeneity
would be to assume that only a subset of workers can work in the industrial sector and
that labor in the industrial sector earns a wage premium. This would imply another
source of pecuniary externalities in the economy and the economy would continue to
exhibit multiple investment equilibria.22 Finally, our ¯ndings on the political economy
of coordination would continue to hold as technological change continues to leave some
citizens, here unskilled labor, worse o®.
The choice of the mechanized technology (partially) substitutes industrial input
for labor. It, however, does not allow for substitution away from land towards manu-
factures. A natural justi¯cation is that land is essential for growing food. However, it
could be that a mechanized technology allows the same amount of food to be produced
on less land, say via multi-cropping. To account for this our agricultural production
function could be generalized to allow the industrial input and land to be substitutes.
This will potentially reduce the gains for landowners associated with adoption of the
22This wage mechanism is similar to the source of pecuniary externalities that underlies the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b)
18mechanized technology. However, as long as the wage reduction associated with the
adoption of the mechanized technology was su±cient the landowners' would continue
to earn higher pro¯ts with manufactures, and our ¯ndings in this paper would hold.
The political economy of coordination has received limited attention in the lit-
erature, in part because most models of coordination failure consider an economy
populated by individuals with identical endowments. Our ¯ndings demonstrate that
once we move to a setting with heterogenous agents, the political economy of co-
ordination is central to understanding the choice of policies. Perhaps most striking
is our ¯nding with decentralized investment decisions a policy-maker belonging to
the group whose factor returns are adversely a®ected by technological change cannot
a®ect coordination. Moreover, the reason for this is her inability to commit to not
redistribute income in favor of her group.
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225 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (1) p¿ = w¿. This, combined with the wage equation (equation (3)),
gives:
nb =
L ¡ 1
x
and nm =
L ¡ °
x
(9)
° < 1 ) nm > nb: Hence, the number of industrial varieties produced is strictly
higher with the mechanized technology.
Proof of Proposition 2
By assumption ¼b > 0. Consider an equilibrium in which all landowners choose
the basic technology. In equilibrium all landowners make a positive pro¯t. This
equilibrium is Nash if, conditional on all other landowners' choosing the mechanized
technology, it is not pro¯table for any single landowner to choose the mechanized
technology. This is true i® ¯j¼b ¸ ¯j¼m or
1 ¡ wb ¸ 1 ¡ °wb ¡ ·Pb
Substituting for wb and Pb, an equilibrium in which all landowners choose the basic
technology exists if
·
(1 ¡ °)
¸ nb
1
("¡1) (10)
Now consider an equilibrium in which landowners choose the mechanized technology.
Landowner j will not deviate to investing in the basic technology i® ¯j¼m ¸ ¯j¼m or
(1 ¡ °wm ¡ ·Pm) ¸ (1 ¡ wm)
which simpli¯es to
·
(1 ¡ °)
· nm
1
("¡1) (11)
23Comparing (10) and (11) and noting that nm > nb implies that the economy is
characterized by multiple investment equilibria if
n
1
("¡1)
b ·
·
(1 ¡ °)
· n
1
("¡1)
m (12)
Further, equations (10), (11) and (12) imply a unique equilibrium in which landowners
invest in the basic technology if
·
(1 ¡ °)
> n
1
("¡1)
m
and a unique equilibrium in which landowners invest in the mechanized technology if
·
(1 ¡ °)
< n
1
("¡1)
b
Proof of Lemma 1
The mechanized technology maximizes social surplus if Pb > Pm or
· < x(n
"
"¡1
m ¡ n
"
"¡1
b ) (13)
Combining (12) and (13) it follows that the mechanized technology maximizes social
surplus in the M.E. regime if
x(n
"
"¡1
m ¡ n
"
"¡1
b ) > (1 ¡ °)n
1
("¡1)
m
Rearranging this expression gives:
n
"
"¡1
m ¡ n
"
"¡1
b
n
1
"¡1
m
>
1 ¡ °
x
(14)
Note that
1¡°
x =
(L¡°)¡(L¡1)
x = nm ¡ nb. Substituting in (14) and solving gives
n
1
"¡1
m > n
1
"¡1
b (15)
Equation (15) always holds. Hence, the mechanized technology maximizes social
surplus in the multiple equilibria regime.
24Proof of Proposition 3
In the multiple equilibria regime pm < pb: To see this note Pm < Pb (from Lemma 1).
Further from proposition 1 we know that nm > nb: It follows that, since P¿ = n
1
1¡"
¿ p¿
a necessary condition for Pm < Pb is pm < pb:
We ¯rst show that the mechanized technology raises landowners' indirect utility, but
reduces workers. That is:
Lwm
N ¡ k
P
¡(1¡º)
m <
wbL
N ¡ k
P
¡(1¡º)
b and
¼m
k
P
¡(1¡º)
m >
¼b
k
P
¡(1¡º)
b (16)
Equation (16) simpli¯es to
wmP
¡(1¡º)
m < wbP
¡(1¡º)
b and ;¼mP
¡(1¡º)
m < ¼bP
¡(1¡º)
b
Pb > Pm( from Lemma 1). Therefore, a necessary condition for wmP ¡(1¡º)
m <
wbP
¡(1¡º)
b is that wm < wb. Importantly this is also su±cient. To see this ¯rst
note that w¿ = p¿:wmP ¡(1¡º)
m < wbP
¡(1¡º)
b )
P
(1¡º)
m
pm >
P
(1¡º)
b
pb )
n
(1¡º)("¡1)
m p
v
b > n
(1¡º)("¡1)
b p
º
m (17)
Since nm > nb and pb > pm this inequality (17) always holds. Further a su±cient
condition for ¼mP ¡(1¡º)
m > ¼bP
¡(1¡º)
b is that ¼m > ¼b. Therefore if wm < wb ) ¼m >
¼b then equation (16) always holds.
¼b < ¼m holds if (°wm + ·Pm) < wb. This simpli¯es to (° + ·n
1
1¡"
m )wm < wb:
Therefore
wm < wb and ;¼m > ¼b (18)
if max
·
wm;(° + ·n
1
1¡"
m )wm
¸
< wb: Clearly if (° + ·n
1
1¡"
m ) < 1, then the su±cient
condition for (18) is wm < wb.
(° + ·n
1
1¡"
m ) < 1 ) · < (1 ¡ °)n
1
"¡1
m . This condition always holds in the multiple
equilibrium regime. Hence, wm < wb ) ¼m > ¼b:
25By assumption
¼b
k >
wbL
N¡k. It follows that a worker's income must be less than the
per capita income i.e.
wbL
N¡k < 1
Nº: From proposition 3 we also know that ¼m
k >
¼b
k and
wmL
N¡k <
wbL
N¡k. Hence ¼m
k > wmL
N¡k:
It follows that a landowner, if elected, will select the mechanized technology and
no redistribution. A worker maximizes her indirect utility by selecting the mechanized
technology and undertaking full redistribution, such that the post tax-transfer income
of a citizen equals the per capita income of the economy { 1
Nº: Landowners are better
o®, if
¼b
k
P
¡(1¡º)
b <
1
Nv
P
¡(1¡º)
m
This expression simpli¯es to
k
N
>
ºL ¡ 1
L ¡ 1
µPm
Pb
¶(1¡º)
(19)
This inequality cannot hold if
ºL ¡ 1
L ¡ 1
µPm
Pb
¶(1¡º)
>
1
2
as a worker would never be elected in that case. Hence, landowners are worse o®
whenever
µPm
Pb
¶(1¡º)
>
1
2
µ L ¡ 1
ºL ¡ 1
¶
A su±cient condition for this is that
1
2
µ L ¡ 1
ºL ¡ 1
¶
< 0
which simpli¯es to
L >
1
2º ¡ 1
which holds under our large economy assumption.
26Fig. 1        Capital - Labour Ratio (No. of Threshers, Tractors & Harvesters used per 100 Agricultural Labour Force)
1
Fig. 2        Share of Agricultural Labour Force
2
1. Data Source: Food & Agricultural Organisation (FAO) website http://www.fao.org. The capital-labour ratio of 1960 is the no. of threshers, tractors & harvesters used in 1961 divided by the 
agricultural labour force in 1960. The ratio of 1990 is derived from data in 1990. The countries studied are:
African Countries:  Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Egypt, Ethopia PDR, Gambia, Ghana, Côte dIvoire, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda
East Asian Countries:  Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
Rest of Asia:  Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
2. Data Source: FAO website (see footnote 1). The share of agricultural labour force is defined as the percentage of total labour force engaged in agricultural production. The countries studied are:
African countries: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Congo Dem Republic, Egypt, 
Eq Guinea, Ethopia PDR, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Côte dIvoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nambia, Niger, Nigeria, GuineaBissau, Réunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Zimbabwe
East Asian Countries: Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, South Korea
Rest of Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Korea DPR, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam 25
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